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IDEOLOGY AS FOREIGN POLICY

When the new state of Turkey was created in 1923, it was a *tabula rasa*. It possessed little sense of itself other than what it did not want to be. The independence war had been fought against external notions of what should succeed the Ottoman Empire; its leaders had few ideas other than clearly to depart from the *ancien régime*, with its recent record of decline, defeat and subjugation. Once a line had been drawn under Sèvres and the Porte, it was time to concentrate on what values and ideas should underpin the new state. The birth of Turkey almost invited the domination of the visionary.

Turkey did not have to look far or long to find its inspiration. The leader of the independence movement, Mustafa Kemal, was already eligible to be its spiritual guide. He was a war hero twice over, a strong personality and a charismatic figure. Moreover, he was a man who had a clear notion of what the new Turkey should be. More Lenin than Marx, however, Mustafa Kemal was not an ideologue. Though he liked to talk politics, he was much more the man of action than of reflection. Thus, he made few attempts to develop his ideas into a cogent ideology. Beyond the sloganeering of the 'Six Arrows' (*altı ok*) and many long and rambling speeches, there was never a codified Kemalism from the pen of its founder. The liturgical and ritualistic minutiae of the new dogma were therefore missing, though there were many more prosaic successors who sought to fill such gaps.

Nevertheless, Atatürk was Moses-like when it came to the adoption of central commandments. Turkey was to be a European nation-state. The state was only to span the space enshrined in the National Pact of 28 January 1920, with the residual territories of empire finally and irreversibly disavowed. The nation was to be built upon an imagined and homogenised Turkish identity, with an ethnic

inclusivism born of the necessity of wartime population movements; only the remnants of the religious *millet* would be classified as minorities and hence receive special status within the state. As with the notions of state and nation, the prevailing philosophy of Turkey was to be 'modern'. 'Ignorance' would be stamped out, whether the mechanical backwardness of illiteracy and economic underdevelopment, or the cognitive backwardness of Islamic piety and the Arabic script.

In implementing his new code of ideas Mustafa Kemal was fortunate. He was aided by a conjunction of circumstances and experiences. These included the overall regional context of the age, the political traditions of the Ottoman Empire and the quiescence of most of Turkish society. From the emerging Europe of the 1920s Mustafa Kemal was helped by a climate of new nationalism, as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires splintered. He was also helped by the growth of the authoritarian ideologies of the day, notably Communism and Fascism, with their culture of a dominant and centralising elite implementing a social as well as a political blueprint for change on a passive population. These values were reinforced by the Ottoman tradition, with its legacy of political centralisation, a strong state and the subjugation of the individual to the will of the ruler. The existence of a predominantly peasant society, with its attachment to the land, poor communications and high illiteracy rates, simply cemented the power of the centre as a cultural hegemon.

Given this auspicious context, Mustafa Kemal did not require a large pool of supporters to propagate his new ideas. The new elite that fully assimilated, accepted and defended his ideas was therefore rather small relative to the overall population. The professional officer corps of the military, the senior administrative elite, a big business elite created by the state, the intelligentsia who provided an intellectual apologetics and the newly emancipated women of the middle classes formed the bedrock of the Kemalist system. For such groups, Atatürk and the ideas he espoused are critical to the retention of a system which enshrines this elite's position of material and social privilege, and maintains the cultural hegemony of their value code.

The rest of society ranged from the selectively supportive through the inert to the suspicious and even antipathetic. There was, of

course, opposition to this new ideology from the outset. The Shaikh Said rebellion of 1925 challenged the supremacy of the state and the displacement of Islam in favour of the new nationalism. That, together with lesser revolts, perished at the hands of the superior force of the state. It was not until the late 1940s, and the advent of democratic politics, that a more sustainable exercise in ideological revisionism emerged, with the role and nature of religion at its core. Since then, Turkey has witnessed an intensifying ideological struggle between Islamism and the Kemalist conception of secularism, with such policy areas as education the recurrent focus of competition.

The realm of foreign affairs and foreign policy making remained largely exempt from this fateful process of the re-Islamisation of society, which began in the late 1940s and grew more rapid from the early 1980s onwards. The government of Turkey was routinely in the hands of Kemalist or Kemalist-dominated political parties; the executive apparatus of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and specialist government agencies largely epitomised the Kemalist elite; in the background, Atatürk's successors in the Turkish armed forces guaranteed, through coercive means if needs be, that the old priorities remained. It is therefore hardly surprising that, with the exception of the final years of the Menderes government,¹ Turkey has witnessed such a consensus over foreign affairs. It is thus only in the 1980s and beyond, with the iconoclasm of Özal, the extensive though subterranean influences of the *tartakats* or religious orders and the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party as a major domestic political force, that foreign policy has become a contested area between Turkey's two gravitational ideologies.

Foreign policy in the Kemalist paradigm

The strong ideological orientation given to Turkey by Atatürk contained an unblinking link between the Western value system of the Kemalist elite and the external orientation of the state.² Kemalism

¹ For an example of the bipartisan approach to foreign policy under attack, see letter from Chancery, British Embassy, Ankara to Southern Department, FCO, FO371/136456, 26 September 1958.

² As Bernard Burrows wrote when British ambassador in Ankara, for the Republican People's Party, established under Atatürk, 'a Western foreign policy is an inseparable

thus provided important parameters within which foreign policy would be framed. The best examples of the ideologically driven nature of Kemalist foreign policy was in its *Westpolitik*, embracing as it has done a variety of different issues from Turkey's membership of NATO and its relationship with the United States, to its attempts to become a member of the EU and the WEU. Here the ideological paradigm of the Kemalist elite was bolstered by other factors: in the case of the latter, a certain historical continuity in the form of the Ottoman Empire's increasing emulation of Europe during the nineteenth century; with respect to NATO, the immediacy of the perceived threat from Stalin's USSR to the north in the mid to late 1940s. Nevertheless, the relentless way in which Ankara has pursued such goals has often had the character of a fixation, born of the values and insecurities of the narrowly based Kemalist elite, rather than a more detached and comprehensive evaluation of national interest.

THE PURSUIT OF THE EU

Speaking in Paris at the beginning of September 1997, Turkey's latest in a long line of recent foreign ministers, İsmail Cem, asserted that Turkey's eventual membership of the EU remained a 'goal' not an 'obsession'.³ It was a phrase which he has repeated periodically during his tenure. In speaking so frankly the minister was trying to mitigate an impression built up during the 40 years or so that Turkey has pursued the EU. Mr Cem's words were, however, ultimately unconvincing, a matter of the man protesting too much. For evidence of the Turkish elite's ideological obsession with Europe one has only to focus virtually at random on any aspect of that relationship over the preceding decades.

From the outset Turkey's ambitions in Europe have owed at least as much to the ideological orientation of the ruling elite as to more material motivations. Consider the example of the first establishment of an organic relationship between the two. The original application for an Association Agreement with the European Economic

part of the striving for the westernisation of Turkey'. See FO371/163832 Burrows-Earl of Home, Annual Report on Turkey for 1961, 22 January 1962, p. 12.

³ *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* cited in *Turkish Press Digest*, 4 September 1997.

Community (EEC), as it was then, was in part prompted by the need for economic aid, in response to the poor conditions prevailing in the country. The EEC was minded to supply that assistance and even to contemplate the admission of Turkey, for fear that the Soviet Union would otherwise seek to fill the gap. In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, and the diminution of both British and French prestige, the Europeans could be forgiven for this bout of over-anxiety.

Contemporary commentators were, however, in no doubt about the primary motivations of the Turkish side. The Ankara correspondent of *The Times*, writing at the time of the activation of the Association Agreement, stated that 'among Turkey's westernized leaders the overwhelming motive for joining Europe is not economic but ideological'.⁴ Other commentators concurred, with, for example, a *New York Times* journalist judging Turkey's new associate status as having 'for the present, more political than economic significance'; by establishing an organic link with the EEC, Turkey was seen as having made a political choice between East and West.⁵

In this view the foreign journalists of the day were undoubtedly influenced by the language and discourse of the Turkish leadership itself. İsmet İnönü, the Turkish prime minister, had constantly emphasised in his speeches during the negotiation of the Association Agreement that Turkey is bound to the West 'not merely', he somewhat surprisingly stated, by 'a sterile military alliance, but by full political and ideological ties'.⁶ Perhaps the best example of the Turkish elite's drive for an umbilical relationship with the EEC, as an expression of its own unrepresentative values, was the overblown rhetoric of the foreign minister on the activation of the agreement. For Feridun Cemal Erkin the implementation of the Association Agreement meant that the domination of the ideals of Kemalism was now irreversible as it represented 'the final consecration of Turkey's European vocation, the aims and ideals constantly pursued and repeatedly proclaimed for centuries'. For him 'Turkey's future and Turkey's welfare are closely bound up with her union with Europe and the European civilisation'.⁷

⁴ *The Times*, 1 December 1964.

⁵ *New York Times*, 10 January 1964.

⁶ For an example of one of these speeches see *The Times*, 22 May 1963.

⁷ Quoted in *The Times*, 1 December 1964.

Consider then the example of the belated deepening of the relationship, through the establishment of a Customs Union (CU) which came into operation in January 1996. The most prudent and constructive course for Ankara to have followed once it had been formally adopted would have been to make an economic success of the union, thereby increasing complex interdependencies with the EU member states. Turkey could then have deployed the argument that not only did it have a CU in advance of membership, unlike other aspirant members from central Europe, but that it had one that was proven to have been successful. The relative improvements in the Turkish economy, together with a legal infrastructure increasingly harmonised with that in existence within the EU, would have given a further boost to Ankara's goal of closer integration.

In reality, the commencement of the CU was accompanied by a new diplomatic onslaught led by the Foreign Ministry towards the attainment of an early, and hence totally impossible, full accession. This renewed and ill advised effort came against a backdrop of election politics, when the outgoing Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller, had tried to milk the CU success for all that it was worth. For instance, immediately after the Strasbourg vote in which the European Parliament finally agreed to the CU, she crowed: 'We will enter the European Union. We will go there with our mosques. We will make them accept us'.⁸

Of course Kemalist ideology was never one dimensional. While a Western orientation and European aspiration were central to it, it had to coexist with other, potentially contradictory, features. Two are of particular relevance. First, as we saw in Chapter Three, there was what has been called a 'Sèvres mentality', an equally obsessive suspicion that Turkey was the object of a continuing conspiracy by outsiders to dismember it territorially. Second, there was a prickly Turkish nationalism, which is swift to perceive insult and injury, and even quicker to opt for the defiant rejoinder or gesture, regardless of its consequences for established goals. This combination of suspicion and thin-skinned nationalism has meant that Turkish politicians and diplomats are, with some honourable exceptions, forever damaging the pursuit of the strategic Kemalist goal of EU membership.

⁸ *The Independent*, 14 December 1995.

Perhaps the best example of this defiant and prickly sensitivity was the reaction of prime minister Mesut Yılmaz and the Turkish government to the December 1997 Luxembourg summit, which Ankara erroneously interpreted as ending all realistic hope of full membership of the EU. The Turkish government decided to suspend political dialogue with the EU and not to participate in a European Conference, which was aimed at promoting increasing policy harmony among the member and aspirant states of the EU. In doing so, Ankara retarded its ability to work closely with the EU even though the UK, one of the leading EU states which enjoys generally good bilateral relations with Turkey, was about to assume the presidency of the Council of Ministers. Yılmaz testily resorted to empty threats, stating that Turkey would give the EU six months to put its house in order on pain of withdrawing its application for membership, a position which was subsequently quietly dropped.⁹ If indulgent European ministers could overlook such an over-reaction, less forgivable were his gratuitous remarks about Germany. Yılmaz referred to Bonn's desire for *lebenstium* in its vision of a Central Europe-oriented enlargement, a crude reference to an old Nazi strategic doctrine. The remark could hardly have been less well timed from a Turkish national perspective, coming as it did as Austria joined the troika of past, current and future presidents for the first time, and as a German presidency loomed beyond that of Austria's. It is incongruous to have to note that Mesut Yılmaz's latest reincarnation in government came in July 2000, when he was appointed deputy prime minister and minister in charge of European Union affairs.¹⁰

A further, shabby example of this thin-skinned nationalism was state minister Ayvaz Gökdemir, from the ultra-nationalist wing of the DYP, who in June 1995 referred to three visiting female MEPs, who had been among the most outspoken critics of Turkey, as 'the three prostitutes'. In addition to being offensive, the remark was injudicious in view of the seniority of the visitors,¹¹ and the fact

that the Kemalist establishment was engaged in an extensive lobbying exercise in order to try to persuade the European Parliament to endorse the Customs Union. In spite of the context, Turkey's elite was unable to prevail upon Gökdemir to do anything other than issue a 'grudging apology', and then only one released through the press.¹² He retained his cabinet position.

Examples of the intrusive nature of other aspects of Kemalist ideology litter Ankara's recent dealings with the EU. There was, for instance, the sentencing of the Kurdish nationalist MPs, who had had their parliamentary immunity withdrawn. The sentences were handed down the day before the EU's six-monthly summit in Essen in Germany, and therefore could not have been better timed to damage any consideration of relations with Turkey at the summit. Furthermore, in the runup to the European Parliament's consideration of the Customs Union the Turkish state chose to indict the country's best known author, Yaşar Kemal, for spreading separatist propaganda. Though he was eventually acquitted, the drawn out and high profile nature of the legal proceedings, together with the fact that his case was being heard by a State Security Court, did Turkey's standing no good at the centre of the EU.

THE PURSUIT OF THE W.E.U.

Turkey has pursued WEU membership with dogged determination. It has done so in spite of the fact that the organisation was the subject of ridicule within European circles for the first three decades of its existence, which the Oxford based expert on European contemporary history, Anne Deighton, has called its 'period of long sleep'.¹³ Even after it woke up, the activities and achievements of the WEU have been modest. Its greatest success was arguably the co-ordination of mine hunting activities in the Persian Gulf during the final phase of the Iran-Iraq war, though even here the involvement of the WEU only served as a political convenience to enable Belgium and Holland to join the effort.¹⁴ There has invariably been

⁹ *Turkish Probe*, no. 262, 18 January 1998.

¹⁰ For a discussion of Yılmaz's appointment to this newly created position see *Briefing*, no. 1301, 17 July 2000.

¹¹ Pauline Green was the head of the Socialist bloc in the ELP, Claudia Roth was the head of the Greens, while Catherine Lalumière is a former Secretary-General of the Council of Europe.

¹² *Turkish Daily News*, 15 June 1995.

¹³ Speaking at a conference entitled 'European Security, Defence and Integration: Western European Union, 1954-96' at St Antony's College, Oxford, 21 June 1996.

¹⁴ Dr Trevor Taylor speaking at Anglo-Turkish Round Table organised by Chatham House and the Foreign Policy Institute in Ankara, 16 March 1989.

widely shared scepticism about what the WEU could achieve on its own, beyond humanitarian and peace-keeping tasks.¹⁵ The main utility of the WEU seemed to be its representation as an institutional model of European co-operation in the defence field.

Many members of the Turkish elite have remained impervious to such observations. They have pursued membership with a vigour wholly disproportionate to the profile, role and potential of the organisation. Ankara followed such a path in the late 1980s for a combination of two reasons. First, attaining membership of the WEU was probably regarded as helping to expedite Turkey's application for full membership of the EU itself. Second, at a time when the re-Islamisation of Turkish society was moving apace the acquisition of membership in yet another Western club would bolster Turkey's increasingly embattled Kemalist elite. As one of Turkey's leading political scientists, Prof. İltis Turan, remarked at the time, the importance for Turkey of WEU membership was one of 'symbolic gratification'.¹⁶

Ankara's quest for WEU membership was facilitated by the expansion of the organisation and the adoption of a Protocol of Accession, the so-called Petersberg Declaration, on 19 June 1992. Turkey became eligible to join as an associate member together with other NATO, non-EU members, Iceland and Norway. However, the changes made in 1992 brought further problems as far as Turkey's future relationship with the WEU was concerned. Ankara felt aggrieved over the areas where its status fell short of full membership. Moreover, Turkey felt its intermediate status particularly sharply because of Greece's full membership of the WEU. Finally, Turkey was more justifiably concerned at the implications of Article 5 of the Petersberg Declaration which promised the support of member states against third party aggression, on the grounds that it could encourage Greece into 'provocative action'.¹⁷

¹⁵ For example, see Dr Philip Gordon, then of the IISS, speaking at the St Antony's conference (see note 13).

¹⁶ Contribution made during a discussion, Anglo-Turkish Round Table (see note 14), 16–17 March 1989. It is worth adding that the report to the director made by his special assistant Keith Kyle on returning from the Round Table on the subject of the WEU stated: 'The Turks showed themselves to be obsessed by the issue; Chatham House Memorandum, 25 April 1989.'

¹⁷ *Turkish Daily News*, cited in *Turkish Press Review*, 31 January 1992.

The response of the WEU and its leading members was to look for further ways to accommodate Turkish sensitivities. In July 1992 the WEU Council of Ministers declared that the organisation would not permit Article 5 to be invoked in disputes between NATO members. Turkey's associate status was subsequently enhanced at Luxembourg in May 1994 by a meeting of WEU defence ministers.¹⁸ Rather than acknowledge the energy expended on its behalf and accept the many gestures made in its direction, Turkey remained prickly about its status in the WEU. Though Turkey subsequently played an active part in the practical areas of the WEU's work, the agreement remained unratified by the Turkish parliament. Indeed, within six months of the Luxembourg meeting Turkey was threatening to reassess its relations with its allies if the WEU opened its doors to Central and Eastern European states.¹⁹ More than two years later, Ankara was insisting on seeking to upgrade the relationship to full membership and pressing for such a goal at every platform,²⁰ regardless of the prospects for success or the impact that such pleas would have on member state attitudes towards Turkey.

Foreign policy as a symbol of Islamist revisionism

Foreign affairs have been an important and potent symbol of the growing divergence in outlook and values between the Kemalist establishment and the emerging Islamist movement in Turkey. Foreign policy has not, of course, been the only difference which has helped to define the Islamists as being essentially different from the mainstream Kemalist parties. Social affairs and education are also controversial areas of policy divergence. Nevertheless, foreign policy, unlike these other, more immediately sensitive areas, was apparently perceived by Professor Erbakan and his supporters as an area where they could speak more freely, perhaps because it risked less of an electoral cost. Consequently, Erbakan, who has been the actual

¹⁸ Consequently, Turkey was permitted to contribute military forces to the WEU and establish formal channels for liaison with the WEU Defence Planning Cell, while also being linked into the WEU communications network.

¹⁹ Turkish Foreign Minister Tümtaz Soysal on TRT TV 13 November, cited in BBC/SWB/EE, 15 November 1994.

²⁰ As Defence Minister Tümtaz Soysal put it in November 1996.

or *de facto* leader of organised Islamism in Turkey for more than 30 years, in particular indulged his tendency towards hyperbole by regularly thinking aloud about foreign affairs without inhibition. It was also an area where a new series of transnational ties could be developed which were very different from the predictable, official level relations, predominantly with the West.

THE RHETORIC OF CHANGE

Erbakan has punctuated most of his time in active politics with the rhetoric of foreign policy change. This has been the case as much in the 1970s as in the 1990s. Favourite themes have included Europe, the United States, Zionism, building a resurgent Turkey and the need to establish stronger links with the Islamic world. The repetitive and largely consistent nature of such sentiments articulated over time, it is therefore safe to assume, gives us real insight into Erbakan's instinctive attitudes and feelings towards such subjects. His rhetoric reveals a man one who combines a mixture of pious Islamism, 1950s style Third World struggle and truculent, xenophobic Turkish nationalism.

A typical insight into Erbakan's world view can be seen by comparing his ideas over a 15-year period. In 1977 he spoke freely on the issue of membership of the forerunner of the European Union, as the issue of enlargement came to the fore. On a typical occasion he likened the EEC to a three storey house: on the top floor, he said, lived the Zionist capitalists; on the middle floor were the Europeans, officials in the service of capital; on the bottom storey were the lackeys and labourers, and it was in fulfilling such a role that he believed that the Europeans wanted to drag Turkey in.²¹ Instead, Erbakan advocated the creation of an Islamic Common Market. He also spoke strongly against relations with Israel and in support of the cessation of diplomatic ties with the Jewish state.²²

Some 17 years later, Erbakan's vision was broadly similar. His ideas on closer Islamic co-operation had been elaborated into what seemed to be an alternative and parallel international order for the Muslim world. Indeed, during an unofficial trip to the US in October 1994 Erbakan paraphrased US President George Bush in calling for the creation of a 'new Muslim world order'. This was to consist of

an Islamic United Nations embracing some 200 Muslim communities, with the geographically dispersed components of the Muslim *ummah*, rather than the contemporary Westphalian state-based international order, as the basic organising principle. Erbakan also advocated the establishment of an Islamic NATO, an Islamic equivalent of UNICEF (the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund), a common Islamic currency and, as before, an Islamic Common Market.²³ 'When we come to power', Erbakan declared with characteristic bluster, 'Turkey will start such an Islamic Union'.

Similarly, he continued to reject membership of the EU, though he appeared much more willing to focus on policy issues in order to propagate such a stance. Here, Erbakan's response may have resulted from growing misgivings within Turkish society. On the issue of negotiations, Erbakan attacked the lack of transparency in decision-making in Brussels on EU relations with Turkey, which he saw as taking place in 'a dark room', without recourse to parliaments and people.²⁴ However, it was the issue of the Customs Union, negotiation on the introduction of which had been taking place in earnest since 1993, that appeared most to stimulate comment. Here Erbakan repeatedly focused on the practical effects of the Customs Union, which he stated, no doubt mindful of his party's support among the *esnaf* or small businessmen and shopkeepers, would completely wipe out local tradesmen.²⁵

Firmly rooted behind such practical considerations, however, lay the more deep-seated objection to an organic relationship with the EU. This opposition was founded not least on the importance, Erbakan gives to the issue of sovereignty. In the same statement, Erbakan voiced his fears of Turkey losing its independence if it became more structurally linked to the EU, while one of his long standing lieutenants, Oğuzhan Asiltürk, put it most baldly when he stated that joining the Customs Union would be the equivalent of becoming a colony of Europe.²⁶ It would indeed be problematic for 'a great Turkey' to 'be built again', as Erbakan promised in a populist speech marking the beginning of Welfare's 1995 general election

²³ *Turkish Daily News*, 21 October 1994.

²⁴ Issue discussed by Sami Kohen in *Milliyet*, 17 December 1995.

²⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, 20 March 1995.

²⁶ *Turkish Daily News*, 12 April 1995.

²¹ Retold by Robin Laurance in *The Times*, 10 May 1977.

²² *The Guardian*, 6 July 1977.

campaign,²⁷ if key decisions on trade and economic organisation were being taken abroad. At the root of Welfare's objections to integration with the EU, however, lay the belief that Turkey was fundamentally different. As another senior colleague and party moderate, Abdullah Gül, has said: 'Our opposition to the European Union is based on the idea that we are from a different culture, we have a different identity and a different economic structure than European countries.'²⁸

By the end of the 1990s the position of Turkey's main Islamist party had, formally at least, changed on relations with the EU. Islamists now argued that they were even in favour of EU membership for Turkey, having come to value such European norms as democracy, freedom of speech and pluralism. It may be that this policy sea-change represented, for some of Turkey's more reform minded Islamists, a genuine change of view. What is undoubtedly clear is that this change of line coincided with what has come to be known as the 28 February process, and the sustained pressure of the military on the forces of Islamism, moderate, conservative and radical alike. The closure of the RP and the prophetic expectations that its successor party, the Fazilet or Virtue Party (FP), would also be shut down by the courts appeared to revalue such liberal ideas in the minds of Islamists, especially in comparison to more culturalist values. The relative suddenness and instrumental nature of the change towards the EU have understandably left some sceptical as to the sincerity of the change.²⁹ Even if the motivations of the leaders concerned are not questioned, it is still the case that the RP and then the FP are associated with an anti-EU stance and hence that the support base, whether at a party cadre or voter level, is likely to be suspicious of or even hostile towards the idea of EU membership.

²⁷ *Turkish Daily News*, 18 November 1995.

²⁸ *Turkish Daily News*, 28 November 1994.

²⁹ For example, an authoritative Swedish monograph on EU-Turkish relations opened as follows: 'it should be kept in mind that Virtue's U-turn on the EU was belated. What the Islamic voters really think about the EU is a more complicated question. However, one thing is certain; Virtue's 'aye' is neither affirmative nor definite. A lot of the support for the EU within the party seems to be contingent on the fact that accession would make it well nigh impossible for the state to ban Virtue or one of its successor parties'. Bertil Duner and Edward Devereil, *Too Bumpy a Road? Turkey, the European Union and Human Rights* (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 2000), p. 13.

Florid though many of Erbakan's opinions might be, it is not possible simply to dismiss them all as being those of a 'religious fanatic'³⁰ or 'dreamer'³¹, as the foreign press of the 1970s believed. Erbakan's exhortations for Turkey to have closer relations with the Islamic world, whatever the motivation, actually indicated a certain perceptiveness. His insistence that Turkey take relations with the Islamic world more seriously came at a time when rising international oil prices and rapidly growing earnings by the Middle Eastern oil producers had given such countries increased economic and diplomatic power. As a net energy importer of some size, Turkey had seen a swift deterioration in its balance of payments current account and was beginning, consequently, to experience the emergence of a burdensome foreign debt, which has handicapped the country ever since. An early engagement with the oil producers of the Islamic world would have spared Turkey some of this agony and stimulated its export industries at an earlier stage. In reality, it would be a further three years before such structural changes were addressed by the Turkish government, when Turgut Özal, economic guru under the Generals, reoriented the economy from an import substitution strategy to one of export-led growth. By that stage, however, the milestone of foreign debt, so large and requiring such handling a decade later, was already firmly secured around the country's neck.

THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL LINKS

The contrasting paradigm of foreign relations can also be seen in Turkey's Islamists' choice of friends abroad. While the Kemalist elite and parties have largely eschewed a relationship beyond it. This world, Erbakan and his supporters have few friends beyond it. This has been a function of both necessity and choice. Historically, the governments, diplomats and journalists of the West have tended to give a wide birth to Erbakan and his parties. For example, until 1995 it was US Embassy policy not to have contacts with the Welfare Party, even though it was a legally constituted entity and had a significant presence in parliament. To a limited extent this is understandable. At different times in his political career Erbakan was a marginal political figure, both ideologically and electorally, in Turkey.

³⁰ *Financial Times*, 16 December 1976.

³¹ *Financial Times*, 6 December 1976.

In the early 1970s, for example, Erbakan was dismissed as 'the Colonel Qadhafi of Turkish politics'.³² This lack of interest is, however, much more difficult to explain at other times. From the October 1973 election to the downfall of the National Front coalition in January 1978, Erbakan was a politician of central importance,³³ routinely holding office as one of the country's deputy prime ministers and acting somewhat as a king-maker.

The absence of contact has not, however, been unidirectional. Erbakan and his colleagues have consciously set out almost exclusively to court states, groups and networks in the Islamic world, or, in the case of Germany for example, among Islamists in the Western world. The Islamist ideology of the RP and its predecessor parties have consistently emphasised relations with the Muslim world. Links with foreign governments have been developed, most notably with Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iraq.³⁴ By the time he assumed the premiership in June 1996, for example, Erbakan had visited Saudi Arabia on 25 separate occasions.³⁵

Indeed, these contacts appear to have been crucial in the activities and survival of Turkey's Islamist parties. There have, for instance, been persistent accusations that Erbakan's Islamists have received funding from the Islamic world dating back to the early 1970s, most notably from Libya and Saudi Arabia.³⁶ For example it was claimed that the Welfare Party received \$500,000 in 1989 from a Libyan backed organisation called Invitation to Islam.³⁷ Erbakan seems to have been associated with a wider Libyan attempt to establish an Islamic international, agreeing to join the International Islamic People's Command, a body which also claimed the involvement of the leading, though controversial Arab Islamist thinkers Hasan al-Turabi and Rashid al-Ghanushi.³⁸ Indeed, Erbakan and his supporters seem

hardly to have bothered to deny such rumours, especially in the early years.³⁹ Nevertheless, in spite of the longevity of such accusations, absolute proof is difficult to come by.

Furthermore, during its long period in Turkey's political wilderness, it was with Islamists from around the world—notably the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria and the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) in Algeria—that Erbakan and his associates developed ties. Interaction with such groups and personalities did not wane when the RP came closer to power. Indeed, Welfare's control of the Istanbul city government was actively used further to foster such ties. Take for example the Islamic Communities Association, which was backed by the Welfare Party until its dissolution in 1999. In May 1996 the fifth convention of the Association was held in Istanbul and addressed by both Erbakan and the RP Mayor of Istanbul Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then the leading contender for the party's eventual leadership succession. The gathering was attended by an eclectic mix of Islamic and Islamist figures. These included both Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader Hasan Tal and the Mufti of Syria, Ahmad Kufaru⁴⁰ (who was known to be close to President Asad) at a time of some improvement in the otherwise cold and suspicious relationship between the Asad regime and Islamists. Leaders of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) then based in Jordan, in the shape of Muhammad Abu Ghannimah and Muhammad Nazzal, together with leading figures from Afghanistan, Lebanon and Pakistan also attended.⁴¹

This was not by any means the only example of the Welfare Party acting like a fringe opposition group when in or close to power. In February 1996 senior RP personnel shared a platform with the controversial American black Islamist activist Louis Farrakhan, when he visited Istanbul on a Middle Eastern tour which also took him to Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya. A month earlier, Erbakan had seemed keen to keep up his old contacts in the region, meeting with the deputy leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan Huwaydi,⁴² in

³² *International Herald Tribune*, 9 October 1973.

³³ In (3 August) 1977 *Le Figaro* called him 'l'homme de routes les coalitions'.

³⁴ See Ruşen Çakar, *Ne seriat, ne Demokrasi* (Neither Shariah nor democracy) (Siyabeyaz, Istanbul, 1994).

³⁵ *Middle East International*, 11 July 1997.

³⁶ See, for example, Emin Çölaşan, 'Para ve Refah' (Money and Refah) in *Hürriyet*, 13 May 1994, pp. 295–7, reprinted in Turhan Dilligil (ed.), *Erbakan'ın ve Erbakan (Erbakanism and Erbakan)* (Arkadaş—Adaş, Ankara, 1996).

³⁷ Sedat Ergin in *Hürriyet*, 13 October 1996.

³⁸ *ibid.*, and 20 October 1996.

³⁹ *Dawn*, 4 November 1973.

⁴⁰ Who was reported at the time as having referred to Erbakan as a 'mutacal' [sic], a fighter for a sacred cause. See *Turkish Daily News*, 31 May 1996.

⁴¹ *ibid.*

⁴² Economist Intelligence Unit, *Syria Country Report*, 3rd quarter 1997, p. 17.

January 1996.⁴³ Ironically, such links threatened to embarrass Erbakan with regimes from the Islamic world with which he sought better relations during his term as prime minister between June 1996 and June 1997. In the course of Egypt's President Mubarak's visit to Turkey in July 1996 Erbakan was warned in candid terms to end his co-operation with the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴⁴ In a characteristic display of *chutzpah*, Erbakan offered to mediate between the Egyptian government and the Muslim Brotherhood, an audacity which apparently did not entirely spoil the visit.⁴⁵

It is, however, the ties established with Islamists in the West that have been more important even than these ties, because they have been forged either with Turkish expatriates or with groups which by dint of their host country can operate with greater freedom, such as those in the US. This was also the case with Germany. Erbakan knows Germany well, having studied in Aachen. He admires the country, especially its post-1945 economic transformation, and speaks the language. Yet, in spite of such apparently auspicious conditions, it is overwhelmingly through the Islamist networks in Germany—historically active and generous supporters of his political activities—that Erbakan has recent experience of German politics and society,⁴⁶ rather than through Germany's mainstream political parties and associations.

There are at least 1,364 associations in Germany which are Islamic in orientation.⁴⁷ The Welfare Party is closely associated with the most powerful of these, the European National View Organisation (*Avrupa Milli Görüş Teşkilatı*), which is strong all over Europe where Turkish migrant workers of rural origin are to be found. The organisation was established under another name in 1974, and was subsequently renamed the Islamic Community National View (*İslam*

⁴³ *Turkish Daily News*, 17 January 1996.

⁴⁴ *Hürriyet*, reprinted in *Turkish Daily News*, 13 July 1996.

⁴⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, 12 July 1996.

⁴⁶ This also seems to be the case in other European countries, such as Denmark, where the link between Welfare and the Turkish diaspora is strong. See Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen, 'The Political Participation of Turkish Immigrants in Europe and in Denmark' in *Les Années de l'autre Islam, Tuns d'Europe... et d'ailleurs* (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales, Paris, 1995), p. 392.

⁴⁷ Ertuğrul Özkök in *Hürriyet*, 22 September 1993.

Toplumcu Milli Görüş) in 1995.⁴⁸ The opaque nature of the organisation and its operations makes it difficult to estimate even such basic characteristics as the number and size of its branches. The organisation does though have a global outreach, with 'tightly structured' branches as far afield as Western Europe, North America, Australia and Central Asia.

In Europe the Milli Görüş controls around 470 mosques, each of which tends to have its own affiliated youth, women's, sports and other networks. It claims to have some 57,000 'mosque members' and around 161,000 followers, although this may be an under estimate. In Germany, the organisation probably controls some 275 mosques, and is believed to have some 26,000 members and to be an important source of funding for the Welfare Party and its successor the Virtue Party in Turkey.⁴⁹ Erbakan's German connections are important in terms of providing a pool of supporters and potential new voters. Two of the Welfare Party's successful candidates in the December 1995 general election came from the Milli Görüş in Germany, one of whom, Osman Yumakogullari, was the leader of AMGT. During its time in office the Welfare Party was particularly interested in arranging a system whereby expatriate Turks in Germany could vote in national elections.⁵⁰ During the December 1995 general election the Milli Görüş was even known to have chartered an aircraft to fly voters home from Holland.

Perhaps the best example of Erbakan's partial and Islamist-oriented experience of the world came with his visit to the United States as the guest of the American Muslim Council in October 1994. True, a meeting was hastily arranged with a junior State Department team, though a mooted meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not take place. However, the overwhelming majority of Erbakan's engagements were with Muslim Americans and their associations, and Muslim politicians from abroad. Meetings were held

⁴⁸ Dr. Gülşan Gurbey, lecturer at Berlin University, interviewed in *Turkish Daily News*, 15 April 1994.

⁴⁹ Report published in January 1996 on Islamic extremism in Germany, prepared by Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in Cologne, cited in *Turkish Daily News*, 23 May 1996.

⁵⁰ For example, justice minister and senior party figure Şevket Kazan visited Bonn in November 1996, where he discussed different possible procedures with his German counterpart. See *Turkish Daily News*, 27 November 1996.

that included Yememis, Sudanese and FIS representatives, together with opposition deputies from Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Kuwait. Even a delegation from Brazil was reported as having flown to Washington to meet Erbakan.⁵¹

When he was appointed to the premiership in June 1996 it was from such organisations as the American Muslim Council and the United Association for Studies and Research that Erbakan received enthusiastic messages of congratulation, even as the US government agonised as to how it should react to his elevation to power.

Foreign policy as a contested domain

The end of the 1980s was pivotal in the emergence of foreign policy as a contested domain in Turkish public policy. There were two reasons for this, one at the unit or state level and the other at the systemic level. First, at the unit level, there was the increasing re-Islamisation of Turkish society in general, and its growing implications for the political domain. The most graphic example of this was the growth in electoral support for Islamist candidates. Underway since 1983, with the Islamist component in Özal's broad church Motherland Party, the electoral successes of political Islam grew with the establishment of the Welfare Party in 1987. Though Erbakan's party performed indifferently in the election in that year, its voter support grew steadily from 7.2% in 1987 to perhaps some 12% four years later.⁵² In 1994 Welfare made its electoral breakthrough, winning control of some 28 major cities, including Istanbul and Ankara, in the local elections of that spring. In the December 1994 general election Welfare emerged as the largest single party, with 21.4% of the popular vote.

Second, and coincidental with the first trend, there was the changing nature of international politics, as a result of East-West détente, the rise of Gorbachev, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. During the days of Cold War friction and the perception of an imminent military

threat it was possible to hold a broad consensus behind the idea of NATO membership and close military relations with the United States. Not everyone in Turkey favoured such a course, but those who objected tended to be on the fringes of left wing and ultra-nationalist politics. Most importantly, Kemalist and Islamist alike could agree on the strategic need to oppose the threat from Moscow. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 suggesting a renewed interest on the part of the USSR in southern expansion, this common perception was reinforced. The rise of Gorbachev in 1986 and, arguably most important, the ignominious withdrawal of the USSR from Afghanistan in 1988, followed in the early 1990s by the collapse of the pro-Moscow regime of Dr Najibullah, were crucial in the emergence of diverging threat perceptions in the eyes of different parts of Turkish society.

The profound changes in domestic and international politics meant that the old consensus on foreign policy was breaking down just at a time when an ideological competition over the strategic direction the country should take was both emerging and becoming more intense. Though such areas as local government, education and social policy all came to the fore at different times, it was in the arena of foreign affairs that the tensions were to be the most sustained. From the December 1995 general election to the end of February 1997 and the military's decisive move against the Welfare-led coalition, foreign policy-making became as much an expression of this ideological high noon as it was a reflection of *raison d'état*.

The best way to illustrate the degree to which domestic ideological considerations drove external relations is to consider foreign policy in action during this time. One of the best cases is Turkey's Israel strategy, driven in 1996 in particular by the military, the self-appointed guardians of the Kemalist legacy; this is described in some detail in Chapter Seven. The second involves two key moments in the year long period when Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan was prime minister, when its Islamist orientation set the agenda.

ERBAKAN'S ISLAMIC OPENING

When Professor Erbakan was finally appointed Turkish prime minister on 28 June 1996 his position was comparatively weak. Though Welfare was the largest single party in the parliament it was unable

⁵¹ *Turkish Daily News*, 21 October 1994.

⁵² The Welfare Party contested the October 1991 general election in an electoral alliance with the ultra-nationalists led by Alparslan Türkeş; it is therefore only possible to approximate the RP vote during this election.

to govern alone. Erbakan was therefore obliged to enter a coalition government with the predominantly secularist True Path Party (DYP). Moreover, the new government had to contend with the power of the Kenalist state, especially in the guise of the armed forces. Consequently, Welfare's room for ideological revisionism was constrained.

Erbakan began by adopting a strategy of survival to ensure a lengthy tenure in power and to routinise Welfare as a party of government. He therefore did not question any of the basic areas of strategy under the control of the Kenalist elite. During this period such an approach pervaded foreign policy. Consequently, Erbakan chose not to contest key issues, in spite of the fact that conditions, to varying degrees in the country, were ripe for policy re-evaluation.⁵³ He decided this in order not to provoke the military, which thrice before had intervened to subvert civilian politics. While this quiescence was greeted with relief by Turkey's Western friends and members of the Turkish Foreign Ministry alike, members and supporters of the party soon questioned this inactivity. Mindful of Welfare's looming fifth party conference, and the almost unprecedented challenges emerging from below to the party machine,⁵⁴ Erbakan became increasingly keen to achieve some success. Given the nature of the audience, that success had to be ideological in content.

The result was the two major foreign tours of Erbakan's premiership: an Asian tour to Iran, Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, and an African tour to Egypt, Libya and Nigeria. The former was, with the exception of one lapse, an impressive success.⁵⁵ Erbakan was able to make the trip in the name of a 'multi-dimensional' foreign policy, which would build ties with significant middle powers

to the east, without jeopardising Ankara's traditional ties with the West. During the visits themselves Erbakan was comfortably able to defend his new initiative on the grounds of *raison d'état*. In Tehran, clearly the leg of the visit that was the most difficult to finesse, Erbakan signed a gas deal aimed at partially alleviating Turkey's desperate, looming energy shortfall, while satisfying the non-party members of his team by firmly raising the issue of Iranian links to the PKK. Further eastwards, Erbakan, who travelled with a large delegation of businessmen, talked of the commercial potential of closer relations with some of the Asian tigers.

Erbakan's Asian tour succeeded in wowing much of his support base at home. His statements that Turkey wanted to be a 'Muslim Japan',⁵⁶ and that he favoured preserving its Muslim identity while promoting modernism and innovation like Indonesia and Malaysia, were well received by Islamist intellectuals already excited by the prospect of the global economic centre of gravity shifting from the north Atlantic to the Pacific Rim.⁵⁷ It also drew varying degrees of applause though not uncritical, from among the cream of the foreign policy commentators in Turkey: Mehmet Ali Birand declared that the Welfare's foreign policy was 'right in principle';⁵⁸ Sami Kohen saw it as 'a dynamic new move for Turkish foreign policy' with 'potential';⁵⁹ Cengiz Çandar wrote that it was 'important and valuable to provide the "Asian dimension", something Turkish foreign policy had lacked until now'.⁶⁰

Erbakan's triumph was, however, to be short-lived. The Asian tour alone would probably have been sufficient to give him the boost that he required before his party's congress. Perhaps Erbakan was intoxicated to the point of hubris by the success of his first tour; perhaps he felt that he had to balance the signing of a defence agreement concluded on 28 August with the state of Israel, into which he had been manoeuvred by the military; yet again, perhaps

⁵³ See Philip Robins 'Erbakan's Foreign Policy', *Survival*, summer 1997.

⁵⁴ The most visible and celebrated case was the struggle for the chairmanship of the Ankara provincial organisation in which Mehmet Tellioglu beat the official candidate Zeki Çelik before the election was annulled by the party's executive board. However, Ankara was far from being the only case of a grass roots rebellion against the centre, and, likewise, far from being the only case where local party elections were overturned.

⁵⁵ In Malaysia, perhaps as a result of finding a kindred spirit in premier Mahathir Muhammad, Erbakan could restrain himself no longer, making largely gratuitous comments, such as asserting that the West had made no contribution to the development of science.

⁵⁶ Erbakan interview with İltur Çevik in *Turkish Daily News*, 12 August 1996.

⁵⁷ This was certainly the tone of a number of contributions from the floor at a one-day conference on the D-8 held in Istanbul, 7 June 1997, in which the author took part.

⁵⁸ *Sabah*, 12 August 1996.

⁵⁹ *Milliyet*, 21 August 1996.

⁶⁰ *Sabah*, 18 August 1996.

Erbakan was concerned to have a further fillip closer to the 13 October congress—whatever the reason, Erbakan decided to push ahead with his Africa tour. Such a mission would in any case have been harder to justify, Africa lacking the economic dynamism and strategic importance of Erbakan's Asian destinations. The Welfare Party leader also chose to ignore some critical warning signs. It was only through the combined efforts of Abdullah Gül and senior members of the foreign ministry that Erbakan was persuaded not to press ahead with his intention to visit Islamist Sudan.⁶¹

Erbakan showed rather less prudence in the midst of objections from Tansu Çiller and Abdullah Gül to the proposed Libyan leg of the trip. Gül considered such a visit 'misguided' coming, as it did, against a backdrop of Colonel Qadhafi's encouragement of Kurdish separatism.⁶² If anyone would have had a feel for the context of Libyan-Turkish relations Gül would. He, together with a DYP state minister, Namık Kemal Zeybek, had been present in Erbakan's place at the 27th anniversary of Qadhafi's coming to power on 1 September; in Tripoli Gül had been snubbed for the absence of Erbakan and insulted by Qadhafi's attack on Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish minority, which turned out to be a rehearsal for the trenchant criticism made by Qadhafi when Erbakan subsequently turned up in person.⁶³ Yet Erbakan insisted on making the visit, mindful of a potential domestic political success if he could persuade the Libyans to honour outstanding payments due to Turkish construction companies.

The first leg of Erbakan's Africa tour in Egypt, with a visit to the Islamic university at al-Azhar included, turned out tolerably well. Indeed, the Turkish prime minister's arrival provided an opportunity for President Mubarak to decline a mini summit in Washington on the ailing Arab-Israeli peace process; providing the excuse for a snub to the Americans would, no doubt, have elicited quiet glee on the part of Erbakan. From then onwards, however, the trip was an unmitigated disaster. In spite of due warning, Erbakan was 'summed' by Qadhafi's call for an independent Kurdish homeland in

his presence at a news conference, at which he also criticised Turkey's growing links with Israel. Rather than cutting his losses,⁶⁴ Erbakan repeatedly exacerbated the situation: first, by agreeing to a final communiqué that implied that the US was guilty of terrorism;⁶⁵ second, through a demeaningly lengthy negotiation aimed at attaining a Libyan commitment to settle the outstanding debt to Turkish contractors.⁶⁶

At home, the secularist press and political opposition went on the rampage. *Cumhuriyet* carried the headline 'Erbakan defends Libya'; *Sabah* wrote of a 'night of shame' for Turkey; *Milliyet* wrote of how the Libyans had treated the Turks as though they were beggars. While Erbakan lamely claimed that he had wrested concessions from Libya, the press view was that the concessions had flowed in the other direction. Erbakan's rash handling of the Libya visit, today widely acknowledged as 'a mistake, a great mistake' in Islamist circles, threatened the very survival of the coalition, with ANAP leader Mesut Yılmaz calling on Erbakan to resign for damaging Turkey's honour, and Çiller ultimately opting to ignore a perfect opportunity to end the coalition in favour of wresting an enhanced status within it. In between, Erbakan was further criticised for consorting with the pariah regime in Nigeria. Ironically, however, this was arguably the most successful part of the tour, with Sani Abacha, the Nigerian leader, so thankful for the visit at a time of international ostracism that a Turkish company received two multi-million dollar contracts soon afterwards.

Ideology is at least as important as geopolitics in the formulation and pursuit of Turkish foreign policy. Throughout the 75 years of the existence of the Turkish state the Kemalist ideology has been a key factor in the definition of national interest. With its admiration for scientific rationalism and its identification with a European

⁶⁴ Abdullah Gül rather effectively did so by dismissing Qadhafi's remarks as 'lunatic nonsense' unworthy of further comment.

⁶⁵ The final communiqué referred to 'countries engaged in terroristic activities against Libya', provoking a candid response from Nicholas Burns on behalf of the State Department, and retaliatory remarks from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁶⁶ The talks on repayments continued for some 12 hours.

⁶¹ One source states that senior Turkish diplomats demanded that Erbakan should not visit Khartoum. *Sabah*, 27 September 1996.

⁶² Editorial by İlmür Çevik, who was then close to Erbakan and his inner circle, in *Turkish Daily News*, 7 October 1996.

⁶³ *Turkish Daily News*, 24 September 1996.

model of development, it is little wonder that for most of that time Turkish foreign policy has been skewed towards Europe and away from the Middle East. Consequently, successive Turkish elites have pursued membership of the EU with a zest which often crosses the boundaries of obsession, and have used up reserves of good will on a pursuit of membership of the WEU wholly disproportionate to the standing or effectiveness of the organisation.

The centrality of ideology to external relations is not by any means confined to the Islamist elite in Turkey. The Islamist mainstream has for three decades used foreign policy issues as an avenue through which to articulate a religious-cum-nationalist vision, as well as a safety valve through which to let off steam. In its development of foreign ties it has proved to be just as selective as the Islamist elite, with its Third Worldist penchant for Islamist movements, some respectable, some less so. Even in power, it has often appeared as if the Welfare Party, and in particular its leader Necmettin Erbakan, have been more comfortable with the rhetoric of opposition than with working within the policy constraints of government.

The critical months between December 1995 and February 1997 proved to be a period when the competing ideological visions of Kemalism and Islamism wrestled and at times battled with each other in the domain of foreign affairs. With the imperatives of domestic politics and the tussle for the soul of the Turkish nation-state uppermost during this period, foreign policy, whether played out as the military's feverish embrace of Israel or the Welfare government's opening to the Islamic world, had comparatively little to do with foreign affairs.

5

SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Turkey's strategic culture

The issue of security is a core component of just about every facet of public policy in Turkey. Consider its profile. The rationale of security is used to justify a large army, the second biggest in NATO; the defence component accounts for 11.4 per cent of the national budget,¹ rising to close to 20 per cent if various other allocations for military industries are taken into account; the state has sought to develop an extensive domestic arms production sector; security is invoked as the justification for an array of measures which erode liberal conceptions of freedom, from press censorship in the south-east to the laws which allow certain political parties to be closed down. At the centre of this enduring preoccupation with security are the armed forces, the Gendarmerie and a plethora of intelligence and other security services, which have proliferated in the 1990s, and whose *raison d'être* is to sniff out and snuff out threats to the state.

The reason for the enduring centrality of security in Turkey is the historical experience of the Turkish state, reinforced by the perceptions and experiences of the present, especially those of the security establishment. Key to the former is, as we saw in Chapter Three, the experience of the early 1920s, when the armed forces resisted attempts from great power diplomats and Greek generals to carve up the rump of the Ottoman empire, which would have reduced an emerging Turkish state to the proportions of a sliver of territory in Anatolia. Though the Turkish army was successful in resisting such a goal, the impact of this existential struggle was traumatic. The legacy of this period has been to create what is now

¹ This was the allocation for 1995.